您的位置:新文秘网>>毕业论文/文教论文/通信/安全讲话/>>正文

论文:分工网络的动态学和稳定性

发表时间:2015/7/14 21:48:49

论文:分工网络的动态学和稳定性

Abstract
This paper uses a cobweb model to investigate coordination failure of division of labour and economic crisis caused by the trade off between sensitive incentives and stability. There are two types of dynamic equations, one is for the number of specialists, and the other is for relative prices. This model can be used to e*plain fluctuations of e*cess demand for professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, with a time lag between education and professional work. Also, it can e*plain the economic crisis caused by liberalization reforms that increased sensitivity coefficients or trading efficiency by raising the mobility of capital, goods, and labour. (JEL: D58, E32)

Keywords: Cobweb model; coordination failure of division of labour; sensitive incentive.


摘要
这篇文章利用一个蛛网模型考察分工的协调失败和由于灵敏激励和稳定性之间的两难冲突引起的经济危机。在这个模型里有两种类型的动态方程,一类是有关专家人数的动态方程,另一类是有关相对价格的动态方程。这个模型能用来解释由于教育和工作之间的时滞而引起的职业需求的波动,也能够用来解释由于增加灵敏系数的_化改革或由于资本、物品和劳动流动而导致贸易效率的增加而引起的经济危机。(JEL: D58, E32)

关键词: 蛛网模型,分工的协调失败,灵敏激励

The dynamics and stability of a network
with division of labour

1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to use a cobweb model to investigate coordination failure of division of labour and economic crisis caused by the trade off between sensitive incentives and stability. At the end of the 20th century, the theory of rati
……(新文秘网https://www.wm114.cn省略2153字,正式会员可完整阅读)…… 
nt prior to privatization reforms. This significantly increased the sensitivity of the feedback mechanism. Privatization reforms further increased the sensitivity, which is good for providing incentives, but not good for stability. Of course, corruption and money laundering were the source of negative signals. Without the moral hazard caused by opportunism, sensitive feedback itself may not be problematic, just like what happened to the highly developed financial market in Taiwan and in Western Europe. But moral hazard itself is not enough to e*plain Russia’s and South Koreas financial crises, since moral hazard in China, which was not greatly affected by the Asian financial crisis, is even greater than in Russia and South Korea. Some economists e*plain the financial crises in Russian and Asia using the conventional models of moral hazard (see references in Chio,2000; Dennis& Kandel, 2000; Chowdhry & Goyal, 2000; Garten, 1999; Corsetti, Pensenti, & Roubini, 1999; Mishkin, 1991). But these models cannot e*plain why the crises occurred when liberalization and privatization were implemented. Lios (1998) model and the model of Aghion et al (1999) show that the trade-offs between reliability, transaction costs, and economies of division of labour and between incentive provision, sharing risk, and stability can e*plain the crises better. Our paper will have features of both Lio’s model with the trade-off between economies of division of labour and coordination reliability of the network division of labour and Aghion et al’s model with a cobweb feedback mechanism. This will allow us to e*plore the implications for the network effects of division of labour on aggregate productivity of the trade-off between sensitive incentive provision and stability of the price feedback mechanism.
This paper is organized as following: Section 2 is devoted to describe a static general equilibrium model of endogenous network size of division of labour, which provides a basis for the dynamic analysis in Section 3. In Section 3, we give the simulation results of cobweb model. The final section concludes the paper.

2. A Static General Equilibrium Model of Endogenous Network Size of Division of Labour
Consider an economy with a continuum set of identical consumer-producers of mass M.[ As shown by Sun, Yang, and Zhou (2004), general equilibria may not e*ist if the set of individuals is finite in the kind of models of endogenous network size of division of labour in this paper. They have proved the e*istence theorem and the first welfare theorem for a general class of equilibrium models with endogenous network pattern of division of labour, of which the static model in this paper is a special case.
] Each consumer-producer’s utility function is
(2.1) .
where *i is the self-provided amount of good i, *id is the amount of good i purchased and k is the fraction of a unit of good purchased that is received for final consumption. Each consumer-producer has the following production functions, endowment constraint for working time and budget constraint.
(2.2) ,, , i=1,2,3.
(2.3)
where *is is the amount of good i that is sold and *i + *is is the output level of good i. is a fi*ed learning and training cost in producing each good. This system of production displays economies of specialization for each individual in producing each good. li is an individual’s labour allocation to the production of good i, called level of specialization in producing good i. Subscript i stands for good i, superscript s stands for the quantity sold (supplied), and superscript d stands for the quantity purchased (demanded), is the price of good i.
According to the theorem of optimum configuration (Wen, 1998, Yao, 2002), there are three types of configurations: Autarky (denoted as A), as shown in Fig. 2.1(a), selling good i and buying good j, denoted (i/j), and selling good i and buying goods j and t, denoted (i/jt), There are si* of the second type of configurations: (1/2), (2/1), (1/3), (3/1), (2/3), and (3/2). Configurations (1/3) and (3/1) are shown in Fig. 2.1(b). There are three of the third type of configrations: (1/23), (2/13), and (3/12), as shown in Fig. 2.1(c).
(a) Autarky (b) Structure P (c) Structure D
no market Partial division of labor Complete division of labor

Figure 2.1: Evolution of Division of Labor
Combinations of these configurations yield three types of structures. M individuals choosing configuration A constitute an autarky structure. A division of M individuals between conf ……(未完,全文共33610字,当前仅显示6045字,请阅读下面提示信息。收藏《论文:分工网络的动态学和稳定性》